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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELLA JENSEN T·UT~TLE 
and RfCHARD DALE ·TUTTLE, 
a minoT, by his Guardian ad Litem, 
~farcella Jensen Tuttle, 
Plaintiffs~~ Respo!ftid;ernts, 
vs. 
PACIFIC INTERMO·UNTAIN EX-
PRESS·, a corporation, and HEATH 
H. C:ORNET·TE., 
Defe'fiAft(}JYtts arnd AppelZam;ts. 
BRIEF O·F APPELLANT:S 
I. 
S·TATE·ME·NT OF F·.AC:TS 
Case No. 
7619 
This action was brought by M-a~cella J ens·en :Tuttle 
and Richard Dale Tuttle, the widow and minor chi'ld, 
respe'Ctively, of Dale Tuttle, deceas~e·d, to recover damages 
for his death resulting from an automoibile col'lision 
which occurred January 15, 1949· at about 8 :30 P.M. on 
the main highway, U. !S. 91, between Provo and S·pring-
ville. 
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.A!t the S!eene of the ~accident the highway has four 
marked :paved lanes with gravel shoulders, and runs 
southeasterly, substantially straight, although turn-
ing slightly to the left or east as one !proceeds toward 
S'p·ringville. ·The: seene of the aecident was illustrated 
by 'two drawings, E:rlribits. FF. and GG, a substantial 
dup~cate· of whi,ch is here:after inserted. 
;Snowpilows had cleared the road, leaving snowbanks 
on the shoulders. Prucked snorw co;vered the· center lanes, 
the outer lanes bein·g substantially cleared by the traffic, 
as shown hy the p•ietures, Exhibits 11, 7, 5, and 6. 
Defendant Heath H. Corn·ette was driving a large 
tractor 'and trailer :for the Pacific Intermountain Ex:press. 
He ie.ft Provo going south, travelling in the lane of traffic 
next west of the center. His speed was estimated at from 
40 to something slightly in excess of 50 miles per hour. 
Just after passing Lou's Place (located on the west side 
of the highway) he, Cornette, undertook to pasts. two 
passenger cars travelling in the same direction in the 
west lane of traffic. After sounding his horn and 'blink-
ing his lights to indicate his intention to pass he suc-
ceeded in overtaking the first ear ·driven by ·Claudius E. 
s.tevenson. Continuing to sound his. horn he was about 
to pass the second ear, a blue Plymouth driven by de-
ceased, when the latte·r suddenly and without giving any 
wa~ing turned left into the center lane as though 
m'aking a U turn immediately in front of defendants' 
truck, where it was struck hroadside (see 'Picture Exhibits 
3 and 4). D'efendants' rig j·ruck-knifed as it and deeeased's 
ear skidded across the highway onto the east side, where 
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a telephone pole W'"as struek, eausing electric \vires to 
drop to the pave1nent and flash as described by the sev-
eral \vitnesses hereinafter mentione-d. 
The foregoing facts are established by disinterested 
eye .... witnesses., as \Veil as defendants' driver. Their testi-
mony is corroborated hy the physical evidence. 
Contrary to the foregoing facts, and in an obvious 
effort to avoid the effects of deceased's own negligence, 
~plaintiffs' counsel set out in the 'beginning to allege and 
prove that deceased was traveling north upon the high-
way, rather than southerly. 
In a desperate- effort to establish some grounds of 
liability, numerous allegations of negligence, numbered 
"a" to ''m," inclusive, were made in the original and 
supplemental complaint. (Tr. 6-ll). At no time were any 
of these mere allegations of negligen,ce conne~cted up, with 
the accident or any proof made that any_ alleiged claim of 
negligence was a proximate caruse of the collisiO'n. In 
fact plaintiffs' theory of liability is, and was from the 
beginning, based upon an -entirely false assumption of 
fact, namely, that deceased W'as travelling north W'hen 
in fact his course ~of travel w~as tow1ard the south. 
The numerous unfounded allegations of negligence 
(several o;f which were repetitious and should have been 
stricken, on motion duly made by defendants) (Tr. 14-
15), together with the inconceivable num'ber of plain-
tiffs' requeste-d instrnctions-45 in all-(Tr. 150-196), 
inje,cted various claims of negli·gence whic!h vvere not 
supported by actual evidence and which created hope-
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less eonfusion on 1ssues submitted to the jury, giving 
rise t.o numerous. pirejudicial errors. 
'The ease was first tried before the Honorable R. L. 
Tuckett, resulting in a ihung jury. It was again tried 
hefore· the HonorabJe J oseplh E. Nelson, beginning May 
15, 19·50, resulting in a v~rdict in p~aintiffs' favor in the 
amount of $24,000.00 (T'r. 26~1). Defendants promptly 
filed ~a motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the 
verdict, and a notice and motion for a new trial (Tr. 254-
5). ·This motion filed May 29, 1950, was taken under 
advisement until the trial ·court finally denied such 
motions N ovemher 15, 1950. Notice of appeal to this 
court was duly filed and perf~cted {D·. 267). 
II. 
S:T.ATEMENT OF p·QINIT:S 
1. Defendants' motion for a directed verdict should 
have heen ·granted on rat lea:st three· grounds, namely: 
(a) 'The collision was proximately -caused or 
proximately contributed to by .deee~ased'IS own 
neglige:nce:. 
(ib) Plaintiffs failed to p~roiVe that dece,ase.d w·as 
tnarveling north as claimed and alleged or any 
·facts S'ufficient to constitute a eause of action. 
(c) Plaintiffs failed to prorve or establish proxi-
mate caJUse and the verdieJt necess·arily rests on 
sp,eeulation and conjecture. 
2. The court erred in instructing the· jury, such 
err:ors being initiated hy the improp·er re·ques.ted instruc-
tions of pilaintiffs, .and in refusing defendants' requested 
instructions, as follows : 
4 
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(a) The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
13 (Tr. 233), improperly defining the duty of de-
fendants and requiring a '' const(JJI'l_t Zo1ok:orut rn.ot 
o-nly ·ahea.d b·ut to the s ,:des of his vehicle." 
(b) The court erred in giving its instructions 
Nos. 14 and 15 ( Tr. 234, 5), requiring defendants 
aibsolutely ''to ·prevent or avoid collid;ing with 
any person, vehicle or other oonvey1a(f/}ce," irre-
gardless of circumstan·ces. 
(c) T'he court erred in refusing to give defend-
ants' requested instructions: Nos. 16 and 17 ('Tr. 
213, 4) in explanation of any sp·eed as constitut-
ing or not con'Stituting a proximate cause. 
(d) The court erred in ·giving its instructions 
No.6 (Tr. 226) and No.9 (Tr. 229) and in pZacing 
too much emphasis ·On so-called presumptiO'ns and 
ilnferences not warramt.ed. by the evidence, and in 
refusin·g defendants' requested instrU;Citions No. 
7 ( Tr. 204) and No. 19 -( Tr. 216) in explanation 
of the effect o;f actual evidence as orvercoming any 
presumption of due care. 
(e}. The court erred in giving its instruction No. 
1 ~Tr. 219-·21) submitting all allegations unsup-
ported by evidervc:e. 
(f) 'The c'Ourt erred in giving instructions as 
me.re abstract statements of law without app,li-
oation to the faots an-d circumsbamces, sueh as 
,court's instructions Nos. 17, 18 and 19 CTr. 237-9) 
and wrongfully denying defendants' requested 
instructions No. 5 ('Tr. 202) No. 8 ('Tr. 205) No. 
9 (Tr. 206), No. 10 ('Tr. 207) and N'O. 11 (Tr. 208) 
in explanation of eontributory negligence and 
eertain statutory and legal duties of deceased. 
3. Plaintiffs' eounsel, through his own client, a 
witness Carol Ellis., wrongfully injected insuranee in-
demnification. 
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4. The eourt erre·d in denying defendants' motion 
ror a new trial when the verdict was not only against 
the great weight of the evidence but was contrary to 
and against the evidence and When there was prejudicial 
errors ~denying defendants a fair trial. 
III. 
EVIDENCE· AND· ARGUMEN'T· 
1. DEF'END'ANTS' M~OT'IO·N FO·R A DIREC~TE.D 
VERDIC:T:. 
Defendants' motion for a dire·cted ver~C.t was duly 
made both at the close oif the evidenee (Tr. 453-4) and 
after verdict (Tr. 254) as pennitted under Rule 50(b} 
U.R.·C.P., the rHasons and groundssp,ecificallyenumerated 
(;Tr. ~53.-4) are aJborve and hereafter stated under ~sub-­
headings (a), (fb) -and (c). This matter necessitates a 
summary of the evidenc·e relating to the manner in which 
the accident ooourred. To ·assist in visualizing the sur-
roundings. and aecident, we have inserted herein a repTo\.. 
duction of the map, plaintiffs' '''Exhibit GG" wh~h 
I 
should he eonsidere;d with the testimony of the various 
witnesses. 
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WITNE·S:SES 
In explanation of the witnesses near enough to have 
seen the accident we should 1nention that three ·of them, 
John Martin l\1·cPhee, Irma 1\ticPhee, his wife, a.nd an 
elderly gentleman, Ehner M. Roberts, were walking from 
Lou's Place to the McPhee residence, a short dis·tanee. 
south on the west side of the highway. Claudius E. 
Stevenson and Carol Ellis were riding in the passenger 
car in the west lane of traffic following the Plymouth 
driven by deceased. Clifford Beardall and Ernest L. 
ll·olt were riding in one of the first, if not the first car, 
to arrive at the s·cene of the ·accident from the north. 
It is clear that those of the foregoing mentioned who 
actually saw th.e accident observed deeeased p·roeeeding 
south near the west edge of the high,vay, and his attempt-
ed turn to the left immediately in front of defendants' 
truck as it was a;bout to pass. In quoting testimony, we 
have referred to the pages as numbered by the eourt 
reporter. 
CL·AUDIUS E. STEVEN·SO·N, driver of the p~as­
senger 'Car immediately following the blue Plymouth 
driven by deeeased, testified that he followed the Ply-
Inouth from the intersection at ·S·eventh East and U. S·. 
Highway 91 to the scene of the accident CTr. 380-1). 
Because his attention was momentarily attracted to the 
three people above mentioned who were walking on the 
side of the road, he did not see the· actual imp~act. How-
ever he testified that defendant's truck p·assed him just 
'before the accident; that he observed deceased's. car 
75 to 100 yards ahead of him just before the imp·aet; 
9 
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tha:t immediately after the impact, he observed defend-
ant's truck and traile~r sliding across the highway to the 
east and observed that the Plymouth had disappeared 
from its former position, later identifying it on the east 
side of the road as the, ear involved in the wreck. He saw 
no nortllhound cars whatsoe'Ver. We quote: 
'' Q. 'Could you estimate the dista~ce that this 
ear was ahead of you~ 
A. I tried to keep~ you behind the car because of 
conditions on the road, and I tried to keep, 
oh, seventy-five yards to a hundred yards 
behind him. 
Q. Which lane of traff~c were you traveling in~ 
A. I tWas, as close to the shoulder as I dared to 
get. The snow was piled quite high, and I was 
in the section that was fairly well worn, about 
three feet away from the pile of snow out 
there. 
Q. What lane of traffic was this ~car ('Tuttle car) 
which was proceeding you traveling in~ 
A. In the same tan e. 
Q. .About how fast were you going as you went 
along~' 
A. Thirty to thiry-five miles an hour. 
Q. When you got near the vicinity of Lou's 
Ptace, did anything unusual occur~ 
* * * * 
A. I rwas attracted by the honking of a horn. 
Q. Where was tha;t honking coming from~ (Tr. 
381) 
A. From 'behind me. 
10 
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Q. And did you see the kind of vehiele that ap--
proached you at th·at time~ 
.. l\.. I was. overtaken by a large tr~ck. 
* * * * 
A. As he passed me the hack of the truck wa:s 
throwing Ui>l a rolling cloud of snow. Almost 
blinded me. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. W eli, when the snow started to elear I could 
see some peop;le walking on the side of the 
road. 
Q. Which side of the road was that~ 
A. That ·would he on the west side of the· road, 
and my attention was attracted to them he-
cause I was pretty elose to them, pretty clos.e 
to the snoiWhank, and I looked up and sarw thls 
truck starting to slide. 
Q. Which way wa:s the truck sliding~ 
A. It started to slide down the highway and 
· gradually turned, the whole truck, and the cab 
part of the truck and trailer started to turn 
side\.vays across the road with a sliding mo-
tion across the highway to the east. 
Q. Did you see the truck come to a sto~p over 
there~ 
A. Yes. (Tr. 282) 
Q. At the· time you noti~ced the truck, or just 
prior to that time, did you see the lights of 
any northbound traffic~ 
A. Not that I recall. 
* * * * 
Q. Were there any other cars around there at 
11 
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that time, besides your car and the two ve-
hicles that had been in this collision~ 
A. Not that I saw. {Tr. 383). 
Q. Now I show you what has been marked De-
fendant's Exhi1bit "3." 
Q. From IWlrat you sarw do you know whether or 
not the ear which you were fo'llowing was the 
car which was involved in the accident (Tr. 
384)· rwith the trU[ck~ 
A. At the time I assumed-All my conclusions 
were that that was the car, because I didn't 
see it ·any further. 
Q. jThat eonclusion was based on what you saw~ 
A. ~That is right. 
Q. At that time~ 
A. At tltat time. 
Q. I show you p~laintiff's Exhibit "B," shorw-
ing an automobile and ask you if you recog-
nize that photograph~ (Handing to witness.) 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is the car that appears in that 
photograph~ 
A. ·That ap~parently is a !P~cture of the car that 
was. involved. (Tt. 385); 
* * * * 
Q. Did any other cars ever get between that car 
* CTuttie 'Car) and your car from the time you 
followed it until the· accident ocpurred ~ 
A. No. 'There was very little; p~assing heing done 
that night, and no one came in between us. 
{Tr. 411)' 
Q. Did you see anyone around either of those 
1'2 
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vehi·cles p.rior to the time th·at you got out of 
your car' 
A. I g·ot out of my car just as the first peo~ple 
started to ap~proach. ('Tr. 412.) '' 
(Insertions in p·arentheses ours) 
Mr. and Mrs. McPhie and Mr. R:o~berts exp~lained 
that at the time of the accident they were walking along 
the west shoulder near the snow bulk, returning from 
Lou's Place to the MeP·hie's residence a short distance 
south, 'both places being on the west side of the highway. 
MRS. ~cPHIE testified: 
'' Q. And rwhere were you ·when the-when your 
attention was first attracted to either of these 
vehicles~· 
A. Just a little north of our home on the high-
way. (Tr. 329) 
Q. What were you doing at that time~ 
A. We we·re walking south to,vard our home. 
Q. Who was with you~ 
A. Mr. Elmer Roberts, my hus'band and myself. 
Q. Now w'hieh side of the highway were you on~ 
A. We were on the west side. 
Q. Was there a snowbank on either side of the 
h. h ~· 1g way .. 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. Where were you walking, with reference to 
this snowbank~ 
A. Well, close to the snow!bank as possibJe. 
Q. Did anything occur about the time that you 
were there whieh directed your attention to 
13 
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either of the vehi,cles involved in the accident~ 
A. Well, we he'ard a sounding of a horn. 
Q. And then what did you do~ 
A. Well, I turned to see if it was honking at us. 
Q. What did you see when you turned around~ 
A. It was p~assing a car about. opp!osite of Lou's . 
. ]jt. was a truck honking. 
Q. And did you see any ·other ·cars. at about that 
time~ 
A. Yes, there was one p~assing us about that time. 
Q. And in whieh lane were these two ,cars travel-
ing~' 
A. The two cars were on the west lane furtherest 
west. 
Q. Which iane was the truck traveling in~ 
A. S:eemed to he on the inside west lane. 
Q. Tell the jury in your own words just what 
happ~ened. 
A. Well, we turned to see if it was honking at us, 
and it rwasn 't (Tr. 3'30) so we p~roceeded on 
south, 'and the ear 1passing us at that time was 
slorwing down and our attention-my 'atten-
tion seemed to go on it heeause I thought per-
hap~s it might he stoptpfing at my home, and a 
truck ~passed and it continue'd to sound its 
horn, and just a little beyond my home the car 
turned directly in front of the truck, and they 
seemed to throw up some snorw then and go 
to the southeast side of the road, or to the 
east side, would he traveling southeast, and 
came to a stop· there. 
Q. 1Then what did you do~ 
A.· Well, I ·went directly to the scene of the acci-
14 
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dent and my hus~band went in my home-in 
our home to ·call the police. ('Tr. 33:1) 
Q. At the time you observed the two vehicles 
come together, did you see whether or not 
there were any other cars coming from the 
south at that time and traveling north~ 
A. No, there wasn't any that I oibs.erved. ('Tr. 
333.) 
Q. With reference to your home, aihout rwheTe 
:were you standing a.t the time this hap,pened ~ 
A. Well, it would he afbout a fourth of the way 
to Lou's, or half way between a road that 
takes.-that goes west off from the highway, 
between a road that-there is a road that goes 
west between our place and Lou's, and we 
were standin·g be·tween the road and our home, 
about half way. 
Q. Now did you observe this car wh~ch was far-
ther south just before the impa:ct, as. to 
whether or not any signals were made of any 
kind to indicate an intention to turn~ 
A. No, I ·didn't see any. Just slowing. 
Q. Did you see any stop~lights c:ome on~ 
A. No. (Tr. 334) 
Q. And how far did the lead car travel after it 
hegan to turn until the point of impact, if 
you have a judgment~ 
A. Well, when the truck wa:s about twenty or 
twenty-five feet in back of it it turned sud-
denly in front of the truc.k. ('Tr. 350) 
Q. But I thought you said it turned out to t'he 
right~ 
A. It had been turning to the right going rather 
slow. 
15 
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Q. I see. And horw far from the point of impact 
did the ear begin to turn to the· right~ 
A. Oh, mayhe thirty-five or forty feet. 
Q. About thirty~five or forty feet from the point 
of imp~act; is that right~· 
A. Yes. ~bout in front of my home. 
Q. All right. You say it wouid he about the 
width of this room then~ 
A. Yes, or just a little more. CTr. 351) " 
J·O·HN MARTIN McPHIE testified : 
'' Q. Now I eall your attention again to that night. 
Where were you when you first hecame aware 
there was-first put on notice that something 
unusual was going to happen, or was happen-
in·g at that time~ (:T'r. 356) 
A. Well, we was ·aibout halfway between my 
place and a little crossing, crossroad there, 
not a crossroad but a lane there. 
Q. When you say ''·we·,'' who was with you~ 
A. Mr. Roherts. an·d my wife and mys.elf. 
Q. Now did you hear anything unusual at that 
t . o.?' nne. 
A. Yes, the sounding of a horn. 
Q. Where did that sound come from~ 
A. Right around Lou's Place. Right close to 
L:au 's little ·cabaret out there. Beer joint. 
Q. Lou's Place is north of your p~l~ce~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What :did you do when you heard this sound-
ing of the horn~ S-ay what you did. 
A. WeN, I just e·dged over. 
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Q. Edged over where~ 
A. Towards the hank of the snowbank. 
Q. Did you see what vehicle ~\Vas sounding this 
horn~· 
A. Yes, it was a truck. 
Q. Where was the truck at that time~ 
A. Just coming up by Lou's, from Lou's Place 
towards-going south. 
Q. What direction was the truck going in at that 
tim. OJ e. 
A. Going south. 
Q. Did you observe any other vehi·cles at that 
time~ 
A. Yes. There was-He was passing one and 
there was one passing us at this-just passing 
us at that time. 
Q. How many vehrcles did you see altogether at 
that time in that vicinity~ (Tr. 3:5·6.) 
A. A truck and :two cars. 
Q. Can you tell us in whlch lane the two cars 
were traveling when you o!bserved them,. 
A. They rwere bo~h in the outside lane. 
Q. 'Could you see where the truck was coming~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·Can you tell us about where the t~bk was 
from the west edge of the -concrete driving 
surface~ 
A. On the west lane. Second l·ane over. 
Q. After you edged over to the snowbank, then 
rwhat did you do~ 
A. I noticed anothe·r car I thought was going to 
17 
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stop at my house, my place. Instead of that 
· he went up a little further and made a turn. 
Q. Where wa.s the truck when he made that turn~ 
A. He was ~aihout even with us, a little past us, 
and the other ('T·r. B57) car was hy us at that 
time. 
Q. Te'll the Jury in your orwn words what you 
saw at that time. 
. It just prulle·d over in front of the truck and 
the tru·ek eollided with him. The other car 
(second or last car) ( exp~lanation in paren-
theses ours) pulled up' hy my p~lace and 
stopped just a little· 'beyond my tpllajce on the 
o:ther side of the driveway. 
Q. Wh'at ~appened after that~ 
A. Right around Lou's Place. 
A. I broke and run for the phone. ('Tr. 358) 
Q. Did you oibserve whether or npt this front car, 
or the car farther south, gave any indications 
of his intention to make a turn~-
A. Never give no signals. at all. ('Tr. 359) 
Q. Well, about horw far off the hard surface did 
he drive to the right~ 
A. From my place, right afbout in here is where 
he made that turn. 
Q. How far to the right of the hard surface did 
he drive~· 
A. Just off to the cement there is aibout all. fTr. 
3'64) 
Q. Was the truck about on the center of the 
highway when you claimed the impact oceur-
re:d~ 
A. Near as I could tell, yes. Passing a car. 
18 
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Q. ·so part of the tru·ck was oveT on the e'ast 
side~· 
A. I wouldn't say that, no. ('Tr. 36·5) 
Q. I see, and you heard the truck honkin·g hack 
here in Lou's vicinity~ (indicating). 
Q. Whether it was north or not you don't lmow~ 
A. I lmow where it-It was comin·g from the 
north. 
Q. You ·don't lmo'v how far north of Lou's~ 
A. Right around Lou's Plooe-. 
Q. Could it have bee-n north of Lou's Place~ 
A. A little. Not much. 
Q. And from that time on, 'v'hile that car was 
traveling almost a thousand feet, it had its 
horn constantly down~ (;Tr. 369) 
A. That's right. 
Q. Didn't it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it didn't let up until the impact~ 
A. Until the imp1act, when I went in the house. 
Q. And during tlrat time the road was. un-
ob·structed, you say, to the east, and the truck 
had ·plenty of room during all that time except 
immediately !before the accident,. when you 
say the ;car turned~ 
A. Yes. CTr. 370) 
A. No ears eoming from ·Sp·ringville. From the 
south. ( Tr. 371) '' 
HEATH H. CO·RNE~T·TE testified: 
'' Q. Norw at that time did you ohseTrve any ve-
hircles. p~roceeding south ·ahead of you~ 
19 
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A. I did. 
Q. And how many did you see at that time~ 
A. Well, there was two of them. The one I 
p~assed and this one I rwas attemp~ting to iplas·s 
were the only cars in the vicinity. 
Q. Whe·re was the vehicle whieh was nearest to 
you, that is the car fartherest north, with 
reference to Lou's Place, at aJbout the time 
you p;assed it~ 
A. Well, it was the first car north. 
*' * * * 
A. I flashed my lights a couple of times and blew 
my horn to· let them knorw I was attempting 
to p~ass. 
Q. You say you 'flashed your lights~ 
A. From low heam to high beam. 
Q·. And then what~ 
A. And hlew my horn. 
Q. And what heam did you have your lights on 
when you p·assed the ear that ·was furtherest 
north and nearest to you~ (Tr. 261) 
A. I had it on low ibeam. 
Q. And in what lane, of traffict was that car 
trave~g in~ 
A. The outside lane. 
Q. :Then aJbout how far was the other par south 
of this first ear that you were approaching~ 
A. I would give no exact answer, but I would 
say around one hundred and fifty fe.et, maybe 
20 
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a little further or maybe· ~a little closer. I 
wouldn't lmow definite. 
Q. • * * Mter you passed this first car, then what 
did you do with respect to the portion of the 
highway upon which you drove the truck~ 
Q. I say after you passed this first car di·d you 
stay in the same lane, or did you go into an-
other lane? 
A. :Stayed in the same lane. 
Q. Now 'vhat happened as you ap!p~roached this 
se'Cond ear which was farther south~ 
A. Well, as I got up near him, why he made a 
left-hand turn in front of me. 
Q. Now p·rior to the time that he made· this turn, 
did you observe whether or not the-re were 
any signals or indications made by him that 
he was going to turn in front of you~ (Tr. 
'262) 
A. There- was not. 
Q. What part of the truck and what p;art of the 
car came togethe-r~ Came in contact~ 
A. W eli, it was albout right on the -corner of the 
right-hand side- of the bumper. Kind of 
diagonal. 
Q. And then what happ~ened after that 1 
A. Shoved. the car straight in front. It sho:ved 
the car straight in front of the truck, and 
knocked in the front wheels to the right out of 
control. 
Q. And then what did you do after that~ 
A. I tried to get lback in control. 
Q. You tried to get-
21 
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A. 'T'ried to get control of it. 
Q. Did you eome to a stop after the irnp~act~ 
A. Yes, on the east side of the road. ('Tr. 263) 
Q. When you observed the car turning in front 
of you, were you ab~e to do anything about 
stop~ing your truck or turning a:side or any-
thing of that nature·?· 
A. It 'h'ap·pened too quick. I didn't have time. 
('Tr. 26:6) 1 
Q. Do you recall whether or not there were any 
northbound ~ars on the highway about the 
time you attempted to ·pas.s the first ear~ 
A. In what location~ 
Q. Coming torwards you? Going north on the 
highway~ 
A. ;There was not. ('Tr. 267) 
Q. When you say this ·car turned in front of you, 
at the time of the imp~act was it straight ac-
ross the highway or was it sideways or diago-
n'al? 
A. You mean the car~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. It rwas in kind of diagona:l shrup1e. (Tr. 281) 
Q. Did you attempt to apply your brakes~ 
A. I hit the hrakes. as fast as I could. {Tr. 286) 
Q. At the time of the impact did you try to turn 
to the right? 
A. I trie:d to get stop,ped. 
Q. Did you try to turn to the right~ 
A. I tried to get stop~ped. (T:r. 302) '' 
In summarizing the remaining portion of the evi-
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denc~, "~e call the court's attention to the fact that coun-
sel for plaintiffs produced no actual or direct evidence 
that deceased was traveling north. ~rrue, through mem-
bers of deceased's family and close friends and relatives, 
counsel attempted to calculate time and show that de-
ceased left Springville some five or ten minutes before 
the actual time of ·collision, around 8 :20 to 8 :35 P·.M. 
('Tr. 145) and that he, deceased, was intendh1g to go to 
Provo to bowl. ·The collision occurred 3.7 miles north 
or Springville and .9 miles south of the intersection of 
Seventh East and the Highway in Provo. (T·r. 159) Horw-
ever, even assuming deceased was intending to go to 
Provo to borwl, no one could possibly calculate what was 
actually in deceased's mind when he left Springville, 
much less what ran through his mind thereafter. He had 
never bowled before (Tr. 162), had never taken any in-
terest in it and it rwasn't shown that he even knew where 
to go. (Tr.l61) His wife, lVIarcella, was going to a basket-
ball game in Sp1ringville and he evidentally had some 
change in plans or intention after leaving home. While 
one or two witnesses said they had seen a northbound car 
some distance from ~he point of collision, there was no 
evidence that any such car, if there was one, was involved 
in the collision. No one testified that they saw any north-
bound car at the time and immediate scene of the ~rei­
dent, which was involved therein. c~ounsel also attempted, 
through Beardall and Holt, to prove that their car was 
the first to arrive at the s-cene of the accident 'and, there-
fore, that the Stevenson car was not the first to arrive. 
This contention, obviously aimed to confuse the jury, at 
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most 'Created a dis-pute as. to .which of the two cars men-
tioned arrived first. There was never any actual evi-
dence or P'roof that deeeased was travelirrg northbound. 
CAR.OL EL:LiiS:, o~cupant of the Stevenson automo-
bile, was admittedly a regular elient of p~aintiffs' attor-
neys. ( Tr. 93) She testified the ear she was riding in 
came to a stop on the west side of the highway. Her 
efforts were princip~lly directed toward claiming that 
the car immediately ahead of them was not involved in 
the ac;cident. She attemp,ted to so infer hy testifying that 
after stopping she observed another car ·parked on the 
east side of the highway. ('Tr. 82) To the contrary, how-
ever, she :deseribed how the truck passed the car she was 
in, {'Tr. 79) how the ·electric wires came down directly 
in front of them, ('Tr. 81, 88, 89) acknowledged that she 
did not see the actual collision, ('TT. 80) admitted there 
wa:s a car immediately ahead of the one in which she was 
riding tra~eling in the same direction. At the time of the 
accident it is elear she was of the opinion that the ear 
immediately ahead of her wa:s the one involved in the 
accident, and was of the same op,inion for two or three 
days thereafter. ('Tr. 96·-97, 92) Prior to the accident 
she had ohserved the taillights of the ¢a:r ahead. Such 
taillights were gone after the i:rrupia~t. ( Tr. 87) We quote 
a portion of her testimony: 
'' Q. And then what happened, Mrs. Ellis~ 
A. We ·Were driving .along in the ear and a truck 
passe·d us., and he was on the left side of us, 
out in the middle of the street. It passed us 
and went UJP' the hill and an a.ocident occurred. 
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Q. Did you see any other car, Mrs. Ellis~ 
A. We we're following a car. 
Q. Where did you first see that car~ 
A. O·h, I think it was on the highway all the time, 
in front of us as long as we were on the high-
way. (Tr. 79) 
* * * * 
Q. Did you see the im·p,act ~ 
A. No, I didn't SHe him hit anything. ( Tr. 80) 
* * * * 
Q. I see. Now what happ·ene-d after~ Just go on 
and tell the ·Court and jury what hap~p~ened. 
A. Well, the electric light wires came down 
across the street. We drove up~ to them, and 
Mr. Stevenson was undecided as to whether to 
try to go underneath them or to back up·, and 
we stopped. And finally lights went out and 
wires came down, and he got out of the car 
and I stayed in the car, and he· was gone a few 
moments and came back and decided to move 
his car out of the highway, so he pulled over 
into the snowbank and left me, and I stayed 
in the car. 
Q. Which snowbank was that~ 
A. On the right side of the road. (Tr. 81) 
Q. And when the truck passed you about how far 
did it pass you to the ea:st, as it went past 
you~ 
A. Well, he swerved all around us, and we gave 
him plenty of room. 
Q. And at that time you could still see the head-
lights of this car proceeding south in front of 
you; is that right~ 
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A. I don't recall looking. I was watching the 
t~ck. '(Tr. 86·) 
* * * * 
Q. Did you see the taillights of that car after the 
truck went out of control~ 
A. I was watehing the truck at all times. 
Q. Answer my question if you will, please. 
A. No, I did wot. (Tr. 87) 
* * * * 
Q. Will you estimate the distance from the wires 
the front of your car was when you stOlplped. 
'The Stevenson car~ 
A. Oh, ten 'OT fifteen feet. 
Q. Was there any oor in front of you at that 
time~ 
A. I didm':t !fi)O'tice. 
Q. Was there a car in back of you~ 
A. Sho:rtly thereafter 1a car pulled in. CTr. 89) 
* * * * 
Q. Where ~were you, with respect to Lou's Piace, 
when the trU:ck p~ass~ed you~ 
A. Well, I could see his. lights from his bright 
sign. ·Close to his p~ace. One side 'O'r the 
othe·r. (Tr. 91) 
* * * * 
Q. How long did you have the assumption that 
the ear in front of you, the car p~roce,eding 
south in front of you, was the car involved 
in the accident~· How long after the accident 
did you eontinue to have that assumption~ 
A. 1Two or three days. CTr. 9·2) 
* * * * 
Q. ·C:an you tell us now, calling your attention 
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again to th~e taillights of this car which was 
proceeding south in front of your car, can you 
tell us about how far south 'Of you the\ tail-
lights of that ~ar were when you saw the~ car 
last, or saw the taillights last, I'll put it that 
way~ If you can give us an estimate. T~wo 
hundred feet~ 'Two hun·dred ·and fifty feet~ 
Fifty feet~-
A. Two hundred to two hundred and fifty feet. 
Q. Then I think you told us yesterday that you 
we·re watching· the truck as it went down the· 
road~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then ·did you say-correct me if I'm 
wrong on this-the truck seemed to be out of 
control~ It went out of control~ 
A. Yes, I did say that. 
Q. That was after the truck ·went past you~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. You didn't see the taillights of the car p~ro­
ceedin·g after that, did you~ 
A. Didn't see t'lvat. 
Q. Did you see any other vehicle at that time, 
other than the truck you saw skidding out 
of control~ 
A. No, I didn't notice it. 
Q. You didn't see any northbound cars in that 
vicinity at all, di'd you~ ( Tr. 95) 
A. Mo. 
Q. Did you see the lights of any northbound ve-
h~~les ~ 
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A. No. 
* * * * 
Q. I see. And at that time you were under the 
assumption that the car you ~were following 
had been involved in this accident with the 
truck, were you not~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that was, based upon the impression you 
received there that night~· 
A. That's correct. (Tr. 96) 
Q. Just before the impact occurred do you recall 
whether or not you saw any pedestrians walk-
ing .along the highway, or on the west side of 
the highway~ 
A. Y~es. I believe that Mr. Stevenson was con-
cerned about them. 
Q. Did you see them~ 
A. Yes, I did. Our headlights-
Q. How many were there~ 
A. I think there We're two or three.'' ( Tr. 98) 
The statement given lby Mrs. Ellis to the investigator 
January 17th, two ·days after the accident, when the facts 
were still fresh in her mind, (Tr. 99-100) re~eived in 
evidence without oibjection (Tr. 102) is significant. It 
('See Defe·ndant's Exhibit 14), the correction having been 
duly initiated hy Mrs. Ellis at the time the statement 
was taken ('Tr. 100) read as follows : 
D·efendant's Exh:lbit "14" 
''Provo, Utah 
January 17, 1949 
''My name is Carol Ellis I am ·25 years of age. 
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:\Iy home address is 251 East 3rd :s!outh in Sp·ring-
Yille, Utah. On J·anuary 15, 1949, I was riding in 
a car driven by ~Ir. Stevenson he lives in Payson, 
Utah. We were traveling south on Highway 91 
\V e were driving along at thiTty five (35) miles 
an hour We were following another car at a 
distance of about one hundred (100) feet. A large 
truck passed us. We were in the west lane of 
traffic the truck was passing in the center of the 
road. the truck had been 'blowing its horn. while 
it had come up 1hehind us. and it was hlowing its 
horn when it went by us and it seemed to keep 
blowing its horn after it p·assed us. After the 
truck got by us the truck seemed to skid out of 
control the truck throwed up a lot of 
'C.E.When it got even with the ·other ear. ·C.E. 
snow(wben j+ vren+ by ns) We di~d not see the car 
and the truck actually hit. We saw the lights of 
the car disap!p·ear and then we could see the car 
on the other side of the truck. the truck seemed 
to Jackknife and the truck also stopp~ed over on 
the East side of the road. I got the imp~ression 
the truck was out of control. the car had been 
going along in a straight line. We had followed 
it for several blocks. the a:ccident envolved the car 
that was directly in front of us and the truck that 
was ;passing. As far as I know there was no traffic 
-corning .from the south. the first car that stop·p·ed 
after we stop·ped was a ear going south that was 
following us. there was also some P'eop,le walking 
along ·the :voad. the sn'Ow that flew up did not 
blo~k our view until the truck was up' bi)! the car 
that was in front of us. the reason we were unable 
to see the ear was that the rear of the tru:ck wa.s 
swinging across the Hi~ghway and the rear of the 
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truck was what blocked my view. 
I have read this statement and it is. correct. 
·C·AROL ELLIS'' 
The same facts were related 1hy Mrs. Ellis to Officer 
Halladay at the scene of the accident. She was quite sure 
that the ear immediately ahead was the same car that 
was involved in the a~ident. (;Tr. ·229) 
I 
O·FFICER ELMO HALLADAY, of the p·rovo City 
Police De,partment, investigating officer, arrived shortly 
after the accident and noted the physical facts, making 
the usual measurements. He identified scratch marks 
south of the point of impact near or crossing the center 
of the highway and indicating the ears had skidded from 
the west toward the east side of the highway. These 
marks were fresh as though something had slid or 
dragged ajcross and could have originated from the Tuttle 
car or from the defendants' truck as it swerved. To 
indicate the general location of these marks the officer 
wrote ''s-cratches'' on the map, Exhib~t GG. ('See T'r. 226-
7-8, 23.3-4, 237) 
For the convenience of the court we have inserted 
herein a photostatic -copy of the officer's original draw-
ing, Exhibit 17, received in evidence, which was prepared 
hy him through what he learned at the scene of the acoi-
l 
dent, including the interviewing of witnesses and ex-
amining the scene at that time. (Tr. 2:46) 
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It is readily observed th-at Officer Halladay was 
satisfied that the accident was. caused when deceased 
turned in front of the truck. There is only one feature 
of the report which requires eXlp[anation. While Officer 
Halladay originally marked in his report that the Tuttle 
car was going south, he explained that he was later in-
duced to strike the word ''south'' and insert the word 
''north'' after talking with Mr. Beardall (a friend of the 
Tuttle family). In this connection, however, Officer Halla-
day explained that the ~basis of his change was soley by 
reason of his conversation w·ith Be1ardall (subsequent to 
the accident) and that as to his own opinion he said : ''I 
really won't krn;ow myself." (Tr. 2'40-241) He had not 
talked with McPhies and as to his original opinion, based 
''on the facts that I found at the scene of the accident 
and also the witnesses that I talked to there'' (iS,tevenson, 
Carol Ellis and Cornette) he wias oif the ovpirnion Tuttle 
was driving south and turned in f.ront of the truck. ('Tr. 
240) 
Perhaps the most amusing witness during th-e trial 
was the elderly gentleman, EL~MER M. RO·BE~RT~s:, 
whose testimony ('Tr. 420-433) was really not worth any-
thing either way. His ·efforts to repudiate his original 
statement (Exhibit 2) ('Tr. 427-8) were on the ridiculous 
side as he clearly acknowledged, hoth in his original 
signed statement and in his direct testimony, that while 
he was aware the truek p·assed 'CTr. 421) he didnlt s~ee the 
collision. (Tr. 423.) He "was. not especially watching the 
vehicles after they passed us'' (Exhibit 2) and he did 
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not lmow whether ''a nortHbound or a southbound car 
was involved in the pollision. '' ('Tr. 431) 
In his efforts ·to dispute that the Stevenson car was 
the firs:t southbound automobile to reach the scene of the 
a:ecident counsel produced Clifford Beardall and Ernest 
L·. Holt, associates in the slot machine business, both 
former employees of the state tax -commission. Beardall, 
while claimi~g his ear was first to rea;ch the scene, ac-
knowledged he didn't ohserve the· pedestrians. ('Tr. 130-
1)' and that he didn't see the accident. He ,could not say 
I 
that he saw any car either northbound or southbound that 
was definitely involved in the collision. This witness, a 
friend and neighbor of the :Tuttle family, ( Tr. 109') at 
most gave negative· testimony. We quote: 
'·'Q. You say you saw the impact :between the two 
cars~ -
A. I seen the collision and the lights. I didn't see 
the impoot, but I heard t:he oollis~ovn.. 
* * * * 
Q. I me,an at the scene of the accident. Was 
either vehrcle moving when you came U1p 
there~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. They had both come to a stop, hadn't they1 
A. That's right. (Tr. 12·4) 
* * * * 
Q. Mr. Beardall, wasn't the flashing of these 
wires the first thing that called your attention 
to the acicident ~ 
A. Yes sir. That isn't what you asked a second 
ago. 
* * * * 
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Q. ..A.t the time you heard the impact you sruw 
neither of the two vehicles involved skidding 
from the west side to the east side of the 
highway, did you~ 
A. I didn't see any skidding across, no. {Tr. 12'5) 
* * * * 
Q. And at that time you didn't see any lights of 
northbound vehicles when you arri~ed at the 
scene, or just before the accident occurrHd, 
did you.¥ 
A. I couldn't see the lights due to the obstruc-
tion. 
Q. l ... ou didn't see any? 
A. No." (Tr. 131) 
The s·ame can be said of ERNEST L. HO·UT. He 
testified: 
"Q. And if there were pedestrians walking just 
west of the concrete edge, and just to the east 
of the snowbank, along the side of it, you 
didn't see them~ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't see the two vehicles come together, 
did you~ 
A. No. 
Q. And when you saw the truck and the car they 
w.ere both stopped over on the east side of the 
highway, weren't they~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your first intimation of the aecident was 
when you saw these wires sputtering~ 
A. That':s right." ('Tr. 140) 
The other witnesses call·ed by plaintiff, wh9se testi-
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mony we have not quoted, -clearly did not see the accident 
and could not have known of any knowledge what car 
was involved nor in which direction it was tra~eling. 
Charles M. RobeTts was three-fourths of a mile north 
of the accident. ('Tr. 2·5) The only knowledge he had was 
of the P. I. E. truck passing him, the snow covering his 
windshield so he had to get out and wip·e the windshield 
in order to pontinue. He further said, "When I got out 
there the condition was there. ;That's all I know about 
that." ( Tr. 26) 
D'Ouglas A. Payne saw the truck pass when he was 
aJhout one and one-half blocks north of where the accident 
occurred. ( TT. 35) 
Dellis Elliott was about a block north of Lou's Place, 
('Tr. 43) saw the truck pass but didn't ohserve the truck 
after it passed Lou's Place. ('Tr. 46) 
Jean Elliott, mother of Dellis, was standing on her 
porch some distance north of the aecident and saw the 
truck p·ass. (T'r. 54) Clearly she did not see the accident 
nor what pja.ssenger car was involved. 
Gordon Elliott observed the truck pass and turned 
his back. ('Tr. 57) He didn't see the accident. (Tr. 66) 
o~ther witnesses called were not near the scene of the 
accident when it occurred. 
(A) THE COLLISIO·N WAS. P'ROXIMATELY 
~CAUS·E·D· Q:R PROXIMATEL.Y CO:N'TBIBU:TED ·TO 
BE BY DE'CEAS.ED'1S· OWN NE·GLIGENCE. 
In summarizing all of the evidence, we do not over-
look the fact that plaintiffs claim that defendants' truck 
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was traYeling slightly in excess of 50 m.p.h. in a ·50 mile 
zone, although the evidence varied from 40 ·or 45 m.p·.h. 
to a possible ma:xin1um of 55. On the other hand, eye 
witnesses '\Yithout question, observed the aecident and 
sa"~ deceased's Ply1nouth as it passed them and saw him 
suddenly and une:xpeetedly turn in front of defendants' 
truck. Speed under such circumstances does not consti-
tute the proximate cause. See Cederlof v. Whited, 110 
Utah 45, 169 Pac. (2d) 777. 
Plaintiffs's sole claim or basis of liability was the 
contention that deceased was traveling north upon the 
highway and, therefore, did not turn left in front of de-
fendants' truck. No claim of liability was made in the 
later event, as the authorities are .clear that contributory 
negligence existed either as a sole cause or at least a 
proximately -contributing cause. 
In TT:errill v. Rarrington, (Me.) 163 Atlantic 266·, both 
cars were traveling alon·g a three laned highway on the 
outskirts of a town. Defendant, who was driving the rear 
car turned left into the center lane and blew her horn to 
indicate that she intended to pass. Be.fore turning left, 
the plaintirf, in the lead car looked in the rear vievv 
mirror and saw ears in the distance but did not see de-
fendant's car in the middle lane. Plaintiff made a signal 
and started to turn left. Defendant applied her hrakes 
and threw her car to the left but still ran into plaintiff. 
A verdict was returned for the plaintiff. Defendant 
entered a motion for a new trial with the state Sup~reme 
Court. The court granted the motion holding as a matter 
of law that .plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~a use of the .accident. In so holding, they said: 
''It is familiar law that the operator of a 
motor vehicle intending to cross the highway in 
front of a car coming from the opposite direction 
on its own right of way must give notice of the 
intention to eross in order to charge the driver of 
the other car with negligence· in pursuing its 
eourse. The law charges the driver of the car mak-
ing such a -crossing with the duty of so watching 
and timing the movements of the other car as 
to reasonably insure himself of a safe passage 
either in stoprp~ing and waiting if necessary. 
'(Maine cases -cited). No less strict rule can be 
app1lied to operators attempting to cross the right 
of way of caTs coming from behind. ReasonaJbJe 
care must he exercised in ascertaining their pres-
ence· in the ·passing lane. The precautions above 
stated must then be taken. 
''·The argument of ~counsel, as we understand 
it, is that, when Mrs. V errilllooked i:q. her mirror 
just before she turned, the Harrington car was 
one of those following hehind several hundred 
feet, and so great was its subsequent speed that 
it tr:aveled that distance and reached the point of 
eollision with the Verrill car, going at the rate of 
15 miles an hour, went diagonally across 20 feet 
of cement in little, if any, more than a second of 
time. 'The mechanical p~erfection of automobiles 
of today has not yet produced such s~peed. A 
reasonable interp~retation of the evidence pJaces 
the Harrington car close up to the Verrill car as 
the latter made its turn. Th·ey were traveling 
the main trUnk line highway and not in the com-
p~act or huilt up section of town. There weTe no 
cars. ap~proaching from the op~posite direction, and 
as already stated, the conduct of the driver of the 
car ahead indicated to Mrs. Harrington that two 
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lanes w·ere and ""'"ould continue to he open and un-
obstructed. Under the circumstances there is no 
credible evidence that she \Vas driving a:t excessive 
speed .,vhen she started to pass or thereafter 
failed to exer;cise the care which eould he reason-
ably expected of a person confronted with the 
turn of a car directly in front of him, ciea.ting an 
emergency requiring the quickest of judgment and 
instant action. 
''We are convinced that the weight of the evi-
de~~e clearly indicates that the negligence of the 
defendant M·attie c .. Verrill was the sole p•roxi-
mate cause of this accident. The verdi·cts in all 
these cases are based on a finding directly to 
the contrary. They are manifestly wrong and 
must ibe set aside. In each case, a ne·w trial is 
granted and the entry is 
Motion ~Sustained.'' 
In Probst v. Smith Hard!IJ)Iare Co., (Lia.) 141 So. 508, 
I 
the plaintiffs were in a sedan ·driving along the high-
way. Defendant's truck was following. The driver of 
the truck sounded his horn and turned out to the left to 
pass when the plaintiff suddenly signalled for a left turn 
and turned in front of the truck, which crashed into the 
Plaintiff's car. From a judgment for the p·laintiff, the 
defendant ap~p·ealed. The ruppellate court set aside the 
judgment and rej·e.cted the plaintiff's demands, saying: 
"Here the testimony of Silver and Daniels 
shows that the sedan made an a:brup~t, unexp;eeted, 
and sudden turn to its left directly into the p~ath­
way of the truck, and ·even if Probst gave the 
proper signal, as it is stated hy him and the others 
who were in his car, the turn wa.s so rash and so 
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sudden that the defendant cannot he held to have 
·he en negligent.'' 
'See also: LriJt:herbury v. Kimmet, (Cal.) 195 Pac. 660, 
Y ourng v. ·Cerrtato, ('Cal.) 37 P 2d. 1063; Madron v. McCoy 
et al., (Idaho) 126 P 2d. 56,6; Dudley v. Surles, (L·a.) 11 
·so. 2nd. 70. 
·(Br F AIL·URE TO PRO:VE ALLEGATIO·NS 
AND D·IRE·CTrON OF TRAVEL .. 
We ask specifically W'hat evi-dence est,ab·liAshes that 
deceased w1as g'oing nort.h up1on the highw·ay? True, 
counsel attempted to -confuse the matter by offering 
testimony of friends and members of deceased's family 
that deceased left !Stpringville about 8 :2·5 P.M. to go to 
Provo to 'howl. He also atte~1ted to confuse, through 
Beardall and Holt which J~ar, Beardall's or Stevenson's, 
arrived first at the S'cene of the aooident. These matters 
do not establish the actual direetion of deceas.ed '·s travel. 
They are necessarily of such a nature that after the 
lapse of several months following an accident, people 
sometimes naturally differ, and are wot of such a char-
acter .as to prove itn fact how am;d in w·hat manner the 
·accidevnt occur·red. Dis in t~rested eye witnesses standing 
beside the road s:ruw the accident. Their testimony cor-
roborated hy physical facts is heyond reasonable doubt. 
In face of the actual evidence, the~e was a total 
lack of piroof of the allegations of the Complaint that 
deceased was travelling north, and consequently a failure 
to sustain the burden of piroving a cause of action. 
('C) FAILURE TO P R 0 1 V E PROXIMATE 
c.AUSE·. 
Even if it were assumed tha;t deeeas-ed was travelling 
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north, "\Ye ask what e-vid~ence est~ablishes an.y p1roxima.t·e 
'oause? Isn't it true plaintiffs' theory rests in specula-
ti'On and conjecturef 
In Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 189, 
170 Pac. 80, 'this. court placed particular em·phasis upon 
the fact that the verdict should not be base·d upon sp~ec­
ulative evidence, and wh:ere the evidence was -conjectural 
and speculative as to the ~proximate cause of de:ceased's 
death the verdict in plaintiff's favor was reversed. The 
court, in the following langultge, furth·er pointed out 
that inferences must not be hased upon assumed or 
supposed facts : 
'' * * * Where, however, as in this case, the 
inference is ibas.ed upon an assumed or sup~posed 
fact, which fact the evidence shows did not exist, 
then the inference is left without sup~port. The 
rule in that regard is stated hy th-e Sup~reme 
Court of Oregon in the case of Goss v. Northern 
Pac. Ry. 'Co., 48 Or. 439, 87 p·ac. 149·, in the 
headnote, thus : 
'' 'Where the evidence of negligen~e is en-
tirely inferenti·al, and the testimony for the de-
fendant is clear and undisputed to the effect 
that there was no negligence, the p~laintiff's· case 
is overcome as a matter of law, and it becomes 
the duty of the judge to take the case from the· 
jury.' '' 
Plaintiffs take comfort in relying upon a presump-
tion that deceased was in the exercise of due care. How-
ever, this rule does wot relieve p~ailntiffs of the duty or 
burden to p1rove proximate cause-facts upon which 
lvability oam be based. 
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Furthermore, this court in several de~isions has 
I 
wisely determined that legal rights should he judicially 
determined upon evidence where the facts can 'be so 
established, and that where there is actual evidence the 
oase must be decided upon the evidence wnd any pre-
sump~t~on of d/ue care must then not be aonsideKed. 
In Re Newell's Estate, 78 Ut:ah 46:3, 5 Pac. (2d) 
230, it was said: 
"When, however, the facts and circumstances 
wer-e shown concerning which the presumption 
was indulged, the presumption ceased and the 
controversy was to be decided upon the evidence 
adduced independently of the presumption.'' 
('Citing cases, including State v. Green, 78 Utah 
·580, 6 Pac. ('2d) 177)." 
And in ·Saltas v . .Affleck (Utah), 102 Pac. (2d) 493, 
it was. said : 
''And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is 
that a.s soon .as evidence is offered, 10n the ques-
tion, the presum·ption ceases and does not longer 
exist.'' 
:Similarly, a p·resumption of negligence has·ed on 
the fact that a collision mary have o~curred on defend-
ant's wrong side of the highway (which it did not in the 
instant case) is comp~letely rebutted by ·evidence showing 
the collision was p•roxirnately eaused hy reason of other 
causes. See, L·arkey v. Chur-ch (Okla.), 192. Pae. 569; 
Kennedy v. (~pldenweyer (L:a.), 12:1 So. 636 and Bragdon 
v. Kellogg '(Maine), 105 Atl. 433. 
In the· latter case the court said : 
''Do the law and the evidence rebut the pre-
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sumption against the defendant in this case~ We 
think they do.'' 
Another reason 'vhy plaintiffs have failed to prove 
facts su:tncient to constitute a cause- of action i'B that if 
it be assumed that deceased were travelling north, the 
evidence sho"~s the collision took place just west of, or 
at hest straddled, the center line. Deceased's Plymouth 
was struck broadside (see Exhibits. 3 and 4), which of 
necessity showed it to lbe partly, if not entirely, on its 
wrong side of the road. So even if it he assumed that 
deceased was travelling north, facts are not p~roven 
estaJblishing liability. 
Another well established principle is that the burden 
of proof cannot be sustained by plaintiff hy p~redicating 
inferences on assumed facts. ·That is to say the burden 
of proof is not sustained hy plaintiff where it is n·e~es-
' sary to base inference upon inference to reach the ulti-
mate conclusion. 
Utah Foundry & Machine 'Co. v. Utah Gas & 
Coke ·Co., 42 Utah '533., 131 Pruc. 1173.; 
Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 22·5 P·ac. 1094; 
Prentice p:a;cking & Storage ·Co. v. United 
Pacific Ins. Co. (Wash.), 106 Pac. (2'd) 3'14; 
Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies .Co. ('Kan.), 185 
Pac. (2d) 158. 
The jury should not be permitted to infer or sp~ec­
ulate that deceased was travelling north; further infer 
that he was proceeding in the exe~cise of reasonable 
care when there were eye witnesses to the contrary and 
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also infer that facts existed establishing liability without 
actual !Piroof. 
We respectfully submit t~at defendants' motions for 
a directed verdict duly made lbef.ore and after verdict 
should have been sustained. 
(2) ERRO·RJS IN INSTRU'C'TING T'HE JURY 
:The eourt in instructing the jury in effect gav;e 
plaintiffs' requested instructions and ·practically none 
requested :by defendants. The instructions given were 
erroneous in several substantial purticulars. For the 
most p~art, those given were mere abstract statements 
of law without any app,lication to the facts' and evidence 
of the case. 
A. IN'STRUCT~[ONS IMIP'RO·PERLY DEFINING 
D·U·TIE'S OF' DEFENDAN·T. 
When instructions are given to the jury defining 
the legal du.ties of defendant whieh place a greater duty 
than the law requires, then such instructions are neces-
sarily prejudicial to defendant's. rights and a new trial 
should fbe granted to afford defendant a fair trial on the 
issues of lh1hility. · The instructions hereinafter referred 
to were induced and given at the specific request of 
counsel for the plaintiffs and sp,ecific e.xce:ptions were 
duly t1aken by the d:efense i(:Tr. 461-73). 
(a) The court's Instruction No. 13 (Tr. 2,3-3, duly 
excepted to, Tr. 466), defining the duties of defendant 
with respect to lookout, among other things said: "In-
cluded in this duty to use due care and diligence is the 
duty to cowstarntly keep 'a ~ookovwt wo't only ahead, but ~o 
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the sides of hi.s ve~i.cle.'' We quote the p~aragr~h. com-
plained of: 
CO~URT·',S INSTRUCTIO·N No. 13 
''You are instructed that it is the duty of a 
driver of a motor vehicle upon the p·uhlic high-
ways of this ·state to at all times exercise due 
~re and diligence in order to p·revent injury to 
persons or property lawfully upon the highway. 
I ncltuded in this duty to use due care and diligence 
is the duty to CO"YYJStamtly keep: a zo,okout not on:ly 
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle, and to 
actually see, as well as to look for, all p~ers.ons, 
objects and things which are reasonably within 
the range of his vision, and whieh may 0onstitute 
a hazard. It is then his further duty after having 
seen, or after he should have seen, to use such 
-care and diligence as a reasonable and prudent 
person, having due re:gard to all conditions. of 
the highway, the presence of intersections, ob-
structions or any other ~ondition which may 
produce a hazard; would use to p~revent injury. 
And in the event that a driver fails or negleets 
at any time to exercise such reasonaJble care and 
diligence, he is negligent. And if, as a proximate 
ff"esult of such negligewce, injury or ·wamage iJs 
oaused to any yPBrson, the driver so causing the 
injwry or damage is l~able tD the p1erson thus 
injured fior ~all d)am,ag es sustained by reas-on of 
such negligewce, unless such p-erson is himself 
negligent and his negligence proximately contri-
butes to ·produce the injury.'' (Tr. 233) 
This ·Court, in reve:rsing the ~ase for a new trial in 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151~ 140 Pac. C2d) 772., at 
page 160 of the Utah R.eport, said: 
"In Instructions Nos. 15 and 21, the· court 
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told the jury that it was the duty of each driver 
to keep· a const(JJYI;t lookout and that if either failed 
to do so he would he negligent. The law requires 
a motorist to maintain a reasonably careful look-
out so as to avoid a eollision with p1ersons or 
dbjeets on the highway. 5· Am. Jur. 5,g~9, Sec. 167; 
Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co., et al., 17'5 
Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 7·67, 18 A.L.R. 667; Boooalero 
v. Wadleigh, 113. ·Cal. Ap·p. 376, 298 P. 52.6. What 
constitutes a reasonably -careful lookout varies 
with the varying circumstances, and it is for the 
jury to determine whether or not a person main-
tained such a lookout under all of the facts as 
shown by the evidence. It may well be that,under 
-certain -circumstances a 'constant' lookout would 
be required and any lookout less than that would 
constitute a lack of due care. From the evidence 
in this cas.e it -cannot he said that reasonruble minds 
would reach only one conclusion, that is, that 
the exercise of reasonable care under the circum-
tances would require a 'constant' lookout. The 
court erred in instructing the jury that a 'con-
stiant' bookout w~ould be re:quired. '' 
In Azzaro v. O·'Connell (1C·al.), 9 P'ae. (2d) 345, it 
was held reversible error to instru-ct the jury that there 
was a duty on the part of a p:edestrian to he consfxllrlttly 
on the alert for vehicles app-roaching. Said the court: 
"We conclude that the giving of this instru,C-
tion was error, because it was an incorrect state-
ment of the legal duty of the appellant and of the 
de-ceased.'' 
In Neidig v. Fisher ·(M.H.), 8 Atl. (2d) 564, a find-
ing of the jury for v~aintiff was sustained, notwithstand-
ing he failed to keep, a eonstant lookout for an approach-
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1ng auto1no'bile. The court pointed out that due care 
might require him to make obseTvation momentarily in 
some other direction, and, furthermore, ''this failure· to 
constantly observe is not itself controlling, hut is only 
an element to be considered with other testimony in 
the case.'' 
In Kaiser Co., Inc. v. American Individual Laundry 
Co. (Pa.), 10 .Atl. (2d) 64, it was held plaintiff in p.ro~ 
ceeding into an intersection, although the disfavored 
driver, under the right of way rule, was not negligent 
as a matter of law in not keeping a con.stJant loolrout in 
defendant's direction. 
:s:ee, also, Prato v. Snyder (Cal.), 55 Pac. (2d) 255. 
The court's Instruction No. 13 was p·articularly 
prejudicial not only in stating that defendant was re-
quired to ''constantly keep a lookout'' hut even went 
further and required defendant to keep a constan.t look-
out i1~ every direction, ''not onl/y ahead, bwt t1o the sides 
of his vehicle.'' It was further improper in that it per-
mitte-d the jury to find that defendant wa;s negligent in 
not keeping a lookout, when the only evidence was that 
he was keeping a loo1kout, and, in the absence of evidence 
to the eontrary, he is presumed to have kept a lookout. 
In Azarro v. O'Connell ('Cal.), 9 Pac. (2d) 345, it 
was held reversible error to instruct U!pon the issue of 
contrihutory negligence as to lookout, where there was 
no evidence of failure to look to overcome ·a p~resumption 
of due care. 
See, also: 
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'Tyng v. Constant-Lorain·e Investment Com-
pany, 37 Utah 304, 108 Pac. 1109, at p. 
1'111; 
State· Bank of Beaver ~County v. Hollingshead, 
82 Utah 416, 25 Pac. ( 2d) 612, at p. 618; 
Woodward v. S1)ring Canyon ~Coal Company, 
90 Utah 578, 63 Pac. (2d) 2'67, at p. 273. 
(B) T·HE C·OURT'S INS'T·RU~CTIONS NUMBE&-
ED 14 (Tr. 234} AND, 15 (Tr. 23'5) WERE SIMILARLY 
ERRONE·OUS IN REQUIRING DEFENDANT' :TO 
EXERCISE A GREATER DE·GRE·E .O·F CARE THAN 
'THE. LAW REQ·ffiRES. 
The court instructed, No. 14: 
''You are instructed that jn addition to the 
duty to keep a prop~er lookout, a driver m~tSt at 
all times maintain such control over his auto-
moibile and must take such measures as are rea-
sonable to stop or turn tro avoid a coUision with 
another vehicle or person urpon the highw1ay rea-
sonably within t:he nang-e of his vision. And in 
the event suc.h drivBr frails or neglects to s:a keep 
his vehicle 11J'nder !COntrol as set forth rab'OVe, he is 
negligent. And where such negligence proximate-
ly causes injury or damage to any other person 
or p~rotperty, the driver of such vehicle is liable 
for all resulting d:amage, unless such person is 
himself guilty of negligence whieh proximately 
contributes to produce the injury.'' CTr. 234) 
The foregoing effectually told the jury that defend-
ant was required to drive so that he could avoid collid-
ing with any one. This typ~e of instruction was condemn-
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ed and the case reversed in :swtas v. A.ffle:clk, g,g Utah 
381, 105 Pac. (2d) 17·6. We quote: · 
''Appellant assigns as error the giving by 
the court of instruction numbered 11, and p·ar-
ticularly that P'art which reads as follows: 'In 
this case it was the duty of the defendant Ken-
neth Butte to drive his automobile on said high-
way, using reasonable care and p·rudence so tha.t 
he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with 
any person on the highway.' 
''·The instruction if followed p~r•actically in-
structed the jury that the defendant in addition 
to keeping a p~rop~er lookout and requiring the 
exercise of ordinary care and pTuden,ce having 
in consideration due vigilance commensurate with 
the circumstances and surroundings required him 
to use such care and prudence so that he could 
avoid colliding with anyone, regardless of whether, 
such one were or were not guilty of negligence. 
"'That part of the inS'trnction failed to take 
into ~onsideration the right of defendant to 
assume that all other !Persons up·on the highway 
would use ordinary care and reasona;hle pre-
caution for their own own safety until the con-
trary ap~peared.'' 
Cnunsel for plaintiff acknowledged the error when 
he requested the court to substitute the original instruc-
tion No. 14 by incorporating the word ·''reasonable·.'' 
However, the use of the word ''reasonaJble'' does not 
cure the harmful effect of the instruction, as we call 
attention to the statute from which the ins~truction was 
apparently derived, namely, Sec. 57-7-113 U.C.A. 1943, 
which reads: 
"In every event sp,eed shall be so controlled 
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as may he necessary to avoid ,colliding with any 
p~erson, vehicle or other -conveyance on or enter-
ing the hrighrwi(J.1J in comp,l/i)(J)'Y/)ce with legal require-
ments OJnd the druty of all p.e;rsons to use due 
care.'' 
Just as this ·Court pointed out in the ·Saltas case, 
supra, the instruction fails to taJke into consideration 
the right of defendant to assume that all other persons 
upon the highway will use ordinary care and reasonable 
precaution for his. own safety until the contrary appears. 
The error existing in the court's instruction No. 14, 
is re-emp1hasized hy the court's instruction No. 15 ('Tr. 
235), the first paragraph of wh~ch reads: 
''·You are instructed that it is further pro-
vided hy law that no p·erson shall drive a vehicle 
on a highway at a speed greater than is reason-
able .and p·rudent under the conditions and havi~g 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing. In every evewt, .sp,e.ed shall b·e so C'On-
-brolled, by using dJue o.are {}j}'/;d caution, so as to 
prevent or (JJV·oid colliding with any P'er~'orn, ve:hficle 
or other oonveywnce orv or entering .the highway." 
(Tr. 2'35) 
It is significant that instruction No. 15 entirely 
eliminated that qualification of the statute which reads: 
"entering the highway in compliance with legal require-
ments and the duty of all persons to use due ~re.'' 
('C) S.P'EED' N·O'T A PRO~IMA'TE CAU.S:E. 
(c:)' ·The court's instruction No. 15 was further 
imp,rop.er in that there was no evidence that defendant's 
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speed \Ya.s a. proximate eause of the collision. 
See: 
~C.ede.rlof v. Whited (Utah), 169 P~ac. (2d) 777; 
~Stoibie v. Sullivan (Me.), 105 Atl. 714; 
Whalen v. Dunbar (R.I.), 115 Atl. 718; 
Burlie v. Stephens (Wash.), 193 Pac. 684; 
Bain v. Fuller (Nova Scotia), 29 D.L.R. 113. 
The foregoing cases hold that speed not :proven to 
be a proximate cause of the collision cannot he con-
sidered. 
Had there been any basis on which it could have been 
a proximate ~ause which we contend there was not, de-
fendants were at least entitled to a qualifying instruc-
tion as a guide to the jury so that the jury would not 
predicate liability on sp~eed if it was not a p~roximate 
cause. D·efendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 ( Tr. 
213) and 17 (Tr. 214), if given, would have aided the 
jury in determining the p·roximate cause. Exception 
was duly taken to the court's refusal to give such re-
quests which read as follows : 
D~EFE.NDANT:S' REQUE·S:TED No. 1'6 
~'You are instructed that the p10sted sp·eed 
at the time and pJace of the accident was. 50 miles 
per hour. You are further instructed that the 
laws of the :sa~ate of Utah do not require unquali-
fiedly that a driver must not eJCceed the posted 
or prescribed speed hut only provide that sp.eed 
in excess thereof shall be prima facie unlawful 
and s~peed slightly in excess of the prescribed 
limit does not necessarily constitute negligence, 
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although a driver is required to drive at a speed 
which is reasonable and prudent under all of the 
existing conditions~. You are further instructed 
that if you find from the evidence that the de-
ceased, Dale Tuttle, just p~rior to the accident, 
was driving south on or near the west edge of 
the highway and suddenly and unexpeetedly made 
a left turn in front of defendant's approaching 
truck, under such ~ircumstances that the driver 
and o:perator of defendant's truck could not rea-
sonalhly have expected or anticip~ated that the 
deceased, Dale Tuttle, was going to so turn to 
the left, then the sp~eed, if any, of defendant's 
truck would not he a p~roximate eause of the 
collision.'' (·Tr. · 213) 
D'EFENDANT:S,' REQUES,TED No. 17 
''You are instructed that if you find from 
the evidence that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was 
driving his Plymouth automobile south near the 
west edge of the highway and that he, Tuttle, 
negligently turned to the left in front of defend-
ants' truek, and that said deceased, Dale Tuttle, 
was not driving north upon the highway just prior 
to the -collision, then the fact that p~art of defend-
ants' tr11;cJk may h.ave been partially east of the 
center line of the highway would not he a proxi-
mate cause of the collision." ('Tr. 214) 
We resp~ectfully submit the·re was revers,ible error 
in the court's instructions n11Illhered 13, 14 and 1'5, and 
in the refusal of the court to give defendants' requested 
instructions numJbered 16~ and 17. 
(D) ERRO·R IN ALL:OWING THE JURY 'TO 
PRE~S·UME DE,C1EASED WAS EXERJCISING DUE 
CARE. 
Throughout the trial, counsel for plaintiff continued 
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to insist that p·lainti:ff 'vas presumed to be in the exeT-
cise of reasonable care. This 'vas not only improp·er, hut 
too much emphasis entirely 'Yas given to the so called 
presumptions arnd inferences not w·arranterd by the evi-
d.ence. 
This is particularly true with resp•e:ct to the court's 
Instruction No. 9 given to the jury as follows: 
''You are instructed that negligence, p·roxi-
mate cause and other issues in this case may he 
proved hy circumstantial evidence, as well as 
direct evidence, and it is for you to judge from 
all of the evidence receive:d in the ease together 
with the inferences that can he fairly and reason-
aJbly drawn therefrom, how the collision, in which 
the decedent, Dale Tuttle, lost his. life, occurred.'' 
(Tr. 229) 
And the court's Instruction No. 6, which, in p~art, 
reads as follows : 
''~There is a p·resumption that the deceased 
used due care for his own protection and did all 
that reasona!hly was required for his own safety.'' 
('Tr. 226) 
While the portion of number 6 quoted was qualified 
by the preceding words, ''In the abse·nce of evidence 
to the contrary," it is highly improhaJble that the jury 
would understand the significance of those words and 
in all proha;hility gave some weight to the p~resump·tion 
mentioned. Had the court given defendants' requested 
instruction No. 19 (Tr. 216) the jury would have been 
clearly instructed that any p·resump.ti.on that deceased 
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w1a.s in the exercise of due oar.e could not b·e consid,ered 
by them as evideYffice. or at all but that their verdict should 
be btased solely on the evidewc.e. 
Furthermore, had the court given the first paragraph 
of defendants' requested instruction No. 7 ('Tr. 204), in 
substance :cautioning the jury not to determine the 
facts by speculation or guesswork, defendants would 
have heen afforde;d some protection as against the 
court's instruction No. 9 which p~ermitted the jury too 
great a latitude to speculate and base inference upon 
inference. 
(E} ERROR IN SUBMITTING NUMEROUS 
AND REPE1TITIOU·S ALL·EGATIO·NS UNS,UPPORT-
E~D· BY E·VIDEN·C·E. 
(d) ·The court's instruction No.1 (Tr. 219-2.1), like-
wise induced hy plaintiff's requested instructi:on No. 2 
('Tr. 151), duly excep1ted to by defendants, simply copied 
all of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint verlbatim 
with respect to every alleged ground of negligence, sev-
eral of which were mere re·petitions of the other, and 
all of vvhich were enumerated without any regard to 
whether there was actual evidence to support a :finding 
of negligence or p·roximate cause based on the particular 
grounds alleged. Instructions of this kind were con-
demned as constituting revers.ilble ·error notwithstanding 
the fact that the jury was instructed that the allegations 
did not constitute evidence. 
In Shields. v. Utah Light & Traction ·Co. (Utah), 
105 Pac. (2d) 347, the eourt said: 
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'' * • * In setting forth the claims of the 
parties to the jm·y, only that portion of the ple·ad-
ings on which evidence had been introduced, 
should be mentioned at all, * * * 
'• ''T e conclude that the reading of the long 
and involved con1plaint to the jury as p~art of the 
charge was error not altogether corrected hy the 
mere admonition that the foregoing is not to be 
construed as evidence but merely sets forth the 
claims of the plaintiff. 
'' * * * the conclusion must he reached that 
appellant's substantial rights were in fact affected 
and prejudiced in a material manner.'' 
Plaintiff's allegations of negligence numbered (a) 
to (k) in the instant :case were extremely rep~etitious as 
follows: 
A. D·riving in excess of 40 miles :pier hour. 
B. Driving at an excessive sp·eed, having 
due regard to the conditions then existing. 
C. Operating carelessly and heedlessly with-
out due caution and circumsp·ection. 
D. Failing to keep a prop;er lookout. 
E. Failing to keep· their truck under control. 
F. Failing to drive on the right side of the 
roadway. 
G. Driving across the center line of the high-
way. 
H. Swinging the trailer out of control. 
I. Passing other cars going in the same 
direction when they could not do so with reason-
able safety as to other vehicles p·roceeding in the 
opposite direction. 
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J. F:ailing to control speed to avoid collision. 
K. Flashing lights on and off, interfering 
with the vision of the deceased. 
Speed is mentioned in three sub-paragraphs, namely 
(a), (h) and (j). Control is repeated in sub~paragraphs 
(e), (h) and (j). c·ertainly by no stretch of the irnagina-
tion were lights a p·roximate cause of the collision, and 
it was error to incor:piorate sub-p'aragraph (k) in the 
court's instructions. 
Lights were not shown to have been a cause of the 
accident and there was error in submitting the issue of 
lights to the jury under the court's instruction No. 16. 
Undue emphasis is further placed upon all plain-
tiff's allegations of neglige~ce notwithstanding the fail-
ure of p·roof with respect thereto, in that the. court 
throughout its instructions continuously hy reference 
·refers hack to the -court's instruction No. 1 referring 
to suh-p·aragraphs (a) to (k), inclusive, hereinabove 
mentioned. 
The authorities are numerous holding that it is error 
to submit alleged grounds of negligence to the jury 
when there is not supporting e·vidence. ·See :State Bank 
of Beaver ·County v. Hollingshead (Utah), 25 Pac. (2d) 
612·, and others. 
{F)' FAIL·URE TO· INS:TRUCIT A JURY ON 
D·EFENDANT·s' ·T:HEORY 0'F T·HE CASE. 
D'e.fendants' requested instru·ctions were, in prac-
tical effect, refused in their entirety and defendant was 
therehy dep~rived of the right to have the jury instructed 
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as to the legal a-nd sta.hdory dtuties of deoe,ase:d in their 
l 
application to the law of contributory negligence. 
Tn1e, contributory negligence was referred to in a 
general sense but there was no instruction giv:en explain-
ing to the jury the general law of contributory negli-
gence as expressly requested by defendants' requested 
instruction No. 3 ('Tr. 202). Defendants were entitled 
to have that matter clearly instructed upon so that the 
jury would be enaJbled to aiJ;ply the law and maJke proper 
application of the law to the particular facts. 
(a) It is also true that the court, by its instruc-
tions numbered 17, 18 and 19 ( Tr. 2·37 -9), instructed 
the jury relative to ~ertain statutory duties, but such 
instructions were me~e abstract statem,ents of law with-
out application to the facts and without p·articular app·li-
cation to the specific ·duties of deceased as contained in 
defendants' requested instructions numbered 9 CTr. 206.) 
and 11 ('Tr. 208). 
It has frequently been held error to give abstract 
propositions of law without P'articular app·lication to 
the facts and ~ircumstances of the case. See Everts v. 
Worrell, 5'8 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043, and Jensen v. Utah 
Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349. In the latter case 
the court, at page 385 of the Utah Report criticizes 
instructions, which while correct as ahstract pro!IJ!Osi-
tions, are at fault "in stating propositions * * * unre-
lated and unrestricted to and regardless of conditions or 
circumstances.'' Said the court: 
''As a general rule a trial court should not 
leave the jury to apply more general principles 
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of law to a case, as here was done hy the defend-
ant's requests. The court should give the jury 
what the law is as applied to the facts either 
stated or assumed, and if so found by the jury. 
The rule is well settled that instructing a jury, 
a mere aJbstract or general statement as to the law 
should he avoided, .and that all instructions should 
be applicaJble to evidence on either one or the 
other of the respective theories of the parties. 
Instructions which are not so applicahle, though 
abstractly they may he correct, are not helpful 
to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to be 
impTO!IJierly applied.'' 
We p~articularly direct attention to the court's instruc-
tion No. 18, for illustration, which reads: 
''You are instructed that a driver proceed-
ing upon a roadway of two or more traffic lanes 
in either direction, shall drive such vehicle upon 
the right half of such roadway.'' 
·such instruction is such a mere ruhstract statement of 
law as to he of no aid to the jury in its application of the 
law to the fajc.ts. The instruction is also misleading in 
that the abstract ~proposition of law therein stated could 
have no possible. application to the case except upon 
the assum:p~tion that the vehicles ·were in fact travelling 
irn opp1osite direC"tiovrtAs. IThe court should not by its in-
structions assume facts to be· true which are disputed 
in the evidence, in this case not 'P'r:oiVen ·at all. 
·The giving of such albstract statements of law was 
held to he reversible error in M·orrison v. Perry (Utah), 
140 P'ac. ('2:d), 772. We invite attention to the following 
p1ortion of the opinion: 
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• • The cowrt fa.?· led t1o properly sepa.!f1a:t:e the 
theories of the p1a'r'ties, but instead; gla'(I)B gene:'ral 
instrUctior~JS treating the rig'hts ,wnd: du.ties of each 
drive.r as b·eing mJUt'1J)al, without reg.ard to defen.d-
ariJt's theory as t-o deceta.sed's negligence in firsit 
bemg on his w~rong side of the highw,ay. Defend-
ant is entitled to have his case submitted to the 
jury on any theory justified by p-roper evidence. 
Morgan v. Bingham ·Stage Coach Line ·Co., 75 
Utah 87, 283 P. 160; Hartley v. Salt L·ake City, 
41 Utah 121, 124 P. 5·2·2; Pratt v. Utah Light & 
'Traction 'Co., 57 Utah 7, 16·9 P. 86S; Smith v. 
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, ·279· P. 893; Martineau v. 
Hanson, 47 Utah ·549, 155 P. 432·. 
''Each party is entitled to have his theory 
of the case presented in such a way a.s to aid the 
jury and not eonfuse it. In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill 
C:onstruction Company, 40 Utah 2'65, 121 P. 10, 
16, the court suggests the :better p·ractice of pTe-
senting the parties' theories of the ease to the 
jury: 'One way the court might have followed in 
charging the jury would have lbeen to charge 
them in sep~arate instructions, first, in accordance 
with :respondent's evidence; and, second, in ac-
cordance with app·ellant's evidence which relate·d 
to the proposition covered hy the instruction in 
question, and in each instruction have directe;d 
the jury to return a verdict in accordance with 
their findings U!POn that question.' '' 
D·efendants.' requested instruetions were based upon 
specific sbatvuto.ry duties governing the conduct of ide-
ceas·ed in the op~eration of the .automo'bile he was driving. 
We direct the court's attention to defendants' requested 
instruction No. 8 ('Tr. 205) based upon the p·rovision 
of Sec. 57-7-122 of the Motor Vehicle Code as follows: 
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"You ar;e instructed that the laws of the 
State of Utah where there is a four lane highway 
provide that a vehicle overtaking another vehicle 
p·roceeding in the same direction shall pass to 
the left thereof at a safe distance, and that the 
driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to 
the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on 
aud1ble signal. 'Therefore, if you find from the 
evidence that the automobile driven by the de-
ceased, Dale Tuttle, was traveling south in the 
west lane of traffic, and that the defendant Heath 
H. Cornette, was about to overtake and pass the 
Tuttle automobile and had sounded an audible 
signal for such purpose, but that said Dale Tuttle 
negligently failed to give way to the right in favor 
of defendants' truck and negligently turned in 
front of the truck and that such negligence proxi-
mately contributed in any degree to 0ause the 
collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover and your 
verdict must be in favor of defendants and against 
the plaintiffs, no caus-e of action.'' ('Tr. 205) 
Defendants were entitled to have the jury instructed 
upon such statutory duty and in such form as it could 
be ~ap!plied by the jury to the rule of contributory negli-
gence. 
We direct attention to defendants' requested instruc-
tion No. 9 ( Tr. 206:), which asked the court to instruct 
the jury relative to the duties of deceased as defined in 
Sec. 57-7-1'33 of the Motor Vehicle Code. The statute 
mentioned specifically p~laces the duty upon the deceased 
if he was traveling South to not: 
'''turn * * * from a direct course upon a 
highway unless and until such movement can 
be made with reasona:ble safety and then only 
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after * * * giving an ap1prop·riate signal * * * '' 
by, see See. 57-7-135, "hand and arm extended 
horizontally." 
We are not una""-are of the fact that the court did 
give a sen1blance of part of the rule in its instruction 
No. 19·, but such instruction was entirely in the abstract 
and did not present defendants' theory of the defense 
to the jury. 
We further ·direct the court's attention to the fact 
that the jury was not instructed with respect to de-
ceased's dbligation to keep a prop·er lookout and hefore 
turning to look and ascertain if there was any ap·proa:ch-
ing traffic. Defendants' by their requested instruction 
No. 10 (Tr. 207), made a specific request, defining de·-
ceased's duty regarding lookout and its ap·plication 
respecting defendants' theory of contr~butory negli-
gence as follows : 
"You are instructed that if the driver of an 
automobile undertakes to make a left hand or U 
turn upon the highway, or to turn his car to the 
left for any other purpose, it is his duty before 
doing so to look and ascertain if there is any 
traffic app~roaching from the rear and if there 
is any app,roaching which would constitute a 
hazard to wait or stop·, if necessary, until it is safe 
to turn, and then only after indicating hy an 
appropriate signal his intention to do so. In 
looking for approaching traffic, it is not sufficient 
to say that one looked but ·did not see that which 
should have been seen, because the driver of an 
automobile about to turn has the duty not only 
to look but to s-ee and observe with sufficient care 
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as to see such vehicles as are approaching within 
,plain view and to heed their presence. Therefore, 
if you find from the evidence that the deceased, 
Dale Tuttle, was prooeeeding south near the west 
edge of the highway and negligently turned in 
front of ap~pro~ching traffic without first deter-
mining if there was any approaching from the 
north which would affect his safety, then he was 
negligent, and if you find that such negligence 
proximately contributed in any degree to cause 
the collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover a.nd 
your verdict must 'be in favor of defendant and 
against the plaintiffs, no eause of action." (Tr. 
207) 
Similarly, defendants' requested instruction defin-
Ing deceased's duty under the terms of Sec. 57-7-128, 
should have been given in such form as to present defend-
ants' theory of defense instead of in the abstract as 
given hy the court in its instruction No.17. 
There were other instructions requested by defend-
ants which were not given by the court, or if given, were 
only given in p~art. Such requests were intended to pre-
sent defendants' theory of the ease to the jury and we 
feel that the court must have lost sight o.f the estrublished 
rule that "defendant is entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to the jury on any theory justified by proper 
evidence. * * * '' Morrison v. p·erry, supra. 
3. REFERENCE T·O INSiURAN,CE IND,EMNI-
FIC.A:TIO·N. 
Counsel for plaintiff couldn't resist the temptation 
throughout the trial in malting reference to a Mr. Kunz, 
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an insurance adjuster who had taken some statements, 
and this matter was effectively driven home to the jury 
when Carol Ellis, plaintiffs' own 'vitness and ~liient 
of plaintiffs' counsel was ~ross-examined for the i)tUrpose 
of refreshing her memory as to what she had told 
Officer Halliday. 
"Q. Did you tell anybody following the accident 
that the car which was involved in a col-
lision with the truck was the car which had 
'been preceding you going south ibefore the 
accident? 
A. Yes, I made that statement. 
Q. Who did you make that statement to? 
A. To the in81.llrarnce inv-e1stigavor. 
Q. And did you make a statement to anyone else? 
A. I don't recall.'' CTr. 90) 
Then when being questioned biY p~laintiffs' counsel 
resp~cting the statement given to Mr. Kunz, she volun-
teered: 
''A. Oh, he came in and introduc:ed himself and I 
introduced him to Mr. Creer, and he expJained 
his 'being there. Wanted to talk to me ahout 
it and wanted me to give him a statement. He 
sat down at a desk and started chatting about 
the accident and talking it over with us, and 
insisted that I give him something definite, 
and I just was very reluctant to even discuss 
it because I didn't understand his position, 
who he was or why he was there. Siaid he 
('Tr. 105) w~as from the insuran~ce oomp:arny. 
MR. HANSO.N: Just a moment. If Your 
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Honor, p;lease, we object to th9.t part, referring to 
the insurance comp;any, as being improper and 
unfair. The witness has obviously talked to her 
-counsel herore, and he knows that's unfair. That 
issue has nothing to do with this case, and I o'b-
ject to it at this time .and ~ite it as error, prejudi-
cial error.'' ( Tr .106) 
The courts have repeatedly eondemned the practice 
of permitting a friendly witness to make reference to 
an insurance adjuster or the insurance company either 
directly or indirectly. Such mis-conduct is held to he prej-
udicial and revers~hle error and is not cured by a mere 
statement to the jury to disregard the statement. See 
Morris on v. Perry, supra, and Sallias v. Affle~ck, supra. 
In the M orrisvow v. Perry case, reference was made 
to insurance when a witness, Penrose, referred to the 
person who took a statement from him in the follo·win~ 
manner: 
''A. I understand from this other man here that 
he was an attorney with an insurance outfit. 
·That is what he told me he was. He did not 
tell me he "\Vas an attorney.'' 
In Consolirjated Motors Inc. v. Ketcham, (Ariz.) 66 
Pac. (2d) 246, on cross examination of one of the defend-
ants, p~laintiff's counsel concerning a statement, asked, 
'·'Who did you make it to~" The answer, "A lawyer for 
the insurance company, at that time, Charlie Young.'' In 
reversing the case, the :court said : 
''It will be seen that the rule lai:d down by us 
is, that unless it ap~pea.rs that the plaintiff was 
entirely without blame in creating the situation 
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w'hich caused the reference to the question of in-
surance, w·e have al\Yays reversed the case when-
ever the matter \Yas in any way brought to the at-
tention of the jury, regardless of whether it came 
through a witness, for plaintiff or defendant, or 
upon direct or cross-exan1ination. It is not suffi-
cient that plaintiff did not mean to bring out the 
prohibited matter, but he must mean not to. 
''It is evident from the cross-examination, 
which referred to a specific signed statHment made 
at a certain time, that counsel for plaintiff had 
in mind one particular statement o.f which he had 
knowledge. We are of the opinion that since this 
must have been true, it was the duty of counsel, 
even if the statement itself might be admissible 
for any purpose, to so carefully guard the manner 
in which it was introduced as to, if possible, avoid 
any reference to the insurance eompany. This he 
might easily have done hy issuing a sub~poena 
duces tecum to the person to whom he knew it was 
made, and then, since it was a signed and written 
statement, identifying it through the testimony of 
the defendant, and if it in any particular thereof 
was admissible, offering or using it in evidence. 
He -chose not to do this but went into the matter in 
such a manner that he should have known it was 
but natural for the question of insurance to come 
out during the cross-examination. * * * In view of 
what we have said as to the highly prejudicial ef-
fect of allowing a jury even to surmise from state-
ments made during the trial that baek of the nomi-
nal defendants there stands an insurance com-
pany, and the great care which a plaintiff must 
use to see that the matter does not come into the 
case through any fault of his, we are of the op~in­
ion that the case must be reversed for a new trial 
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on this ground, regardless of the other assign. 
ments of error.'' 
In Polwnd v. DUJnbarr, (Maine) 157 Atl. 381, counsel 
for the defense had introduced without objection a state-
ment nf the plaintiff unfavoralhle to her ease. On cross-
examination, plaintiff's counsel after having plaintiff 
identify her signature asked: '' 'After the statement 
was made and signed, did you then learn who this man 
represented~' A. 'I did.' Q. 'And whom did he repre-
sent~' " and over defendant's ofbj,ction, she answered, 
'' 'The insurance company.' '' 'The court held this re-
versible error, being prejudicial hearsay. 
See also SimpBon v. Founwat~on Compamy, (N.Y.) 
9'5 N.E. 10; Flemilng v. Hartrick, ·(W.Va.) 141 S.E. 628; 
L:avigne v. BallaJYI)tyne, (R.I.) 17 Atl. (2d) 845; Levy v. 
J. L. Mott !.ron Works, 1'27 N.Y. S. 506·; H·ankms v. Hall, 
(Okla.) ·54 Pac. (2'd) 609; Bratten v. White, (Okla.) 75 
Pac. (2d) 474; Cam,eron v. Pacific Lime (JJn(], Gypsum 
Comp1arny, (Ore.) 144 Pac. 446; and Manigold v. B!Jack 
River Traction Company, 80 N.Y. S. 861. 
4. ERROR IN DENYING MOTION FOR NEvV 
TRIAL. 
'This Honorable Court is undoubtedly aware of the 
rule res~pecting the duty of the lower court to grant a 
new trial when the verdict is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence as w·ell as when a verdict is unsupported by 
probative evidence. Such duty is espeeially important 
when the jury was improp·eriy instructed to the preju-
dice of defendants ·denying their right to a fair trial. The 
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Yerdict being contrary to the only evidence ·w'hich showed 
ho\Y the accident occurred, a ne\v trial should have he:en 
granted on seYeral grounds. 
IV. 
SU)l~IARY _._l\ND ·C.ONCLUSION 
In ~conclusion may we say that the extreme ends to 
''hich counsel for plaintiffs 'vent in making every con-
ceivable allegation of negligence, thirteen in all, which 
were in no sense connected with the eause of the accident 
and in no possible sense of the word shown to have prori-
mately caused the collision, is proof that such allegations 
were not founded on fact. 
When one considers the court'3 instructions con-
sisting of abstract propositions of law without ap·plica-
tion to the facts and circumstances and which wer·e 
ado~ptted almost verbatim from p~laintiffs' requests, to-
gether with the confusion caused by the unfounded argu-
ments of counsel based upon the erroneous assumption 
that the Tuttle car was traveling north, it is no small 
wonder that the jury, out of such confusion and sym-
pathy and in the belief there was insurance, ~erroneously 
returned the verdict it did. 
It is fundamental and the first obligation of the 
courts that cases he decided upon the actual and pro-
hative evidence. :The burden of proof cannot he said to 
be sustained by confusion created through collateral 
matters and assumed inferences and conclusions not 
proven by evidence. 
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'The truth is, as the parties to this suit and eye wit-
nesses lmow full well, that the collision was caused when 
de·ceased, p1roaee:diln.g sowth, suddenly turned left in front 
of defendants' truck, and defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict made both hefore and after the verdict, 
should have ibeen sustaind on ea;ch of the grounds here-
in assigned. 
When the court decided to submit the cas·e to the 
jury, surely if there was any such justification, defend-
ants were entitled to have instructions given which would 
not plaJce upon defendants a greater duty than the law re-
quired and were likewise entitled to have correlative in-
structions given defilwing the leg'al arnd s~atutory duties 
of deceased resp'eoting the Zaw of the ro·ad. 
These and several other errors herein discussed 
effectually precluded defendants from obtaining a fair 
trail and the lower court failed in its obligation to direct 
a verdict-in any event, to grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEW ART, ICANNO·N & HAN~SON, 
E. F. BAL:DWIN, JR., 
A t:t orney s for De f ern)(Jxmts 
and A pp1el~am.ts. 
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